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PASSPORTS, POLITICS AND PATH DEPENDENCY:
COMMENTS ON ANAND AND KLEIN
"INEFFICIENCY AND PATH DEPENDENCY
IN CANADA'S SECURITIES REGULATORY SYSTEM:
TOWARDS A REFORM AGENDA"
Mary Condon*
1. INTRODUCTION
The argument of this thought-provoking paper is that Canada's
system of securities regulation is inefficient in various ways, particularly with respect to the costs involved for market participants
in using it. Further, the primary reason for this inefficiency has to
do with "path dependent" features of the way the system is structured. The specific path dependent elements of the system that are
causing inefficiency and blocking convergence to national or international regimes of regulation are (i) the legacy of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence that has accorded primacy to the provincial
role in the regulation of securities markets and (ii) philosophical
and institutional differences in the approach to regulation by individual provincial regulators. The article considers the prospects for
the "passport system" proposed by most provinces and territories to
alleviate some of these inefficiencies. It concludes that while a passport system will not produce significantly enhanced cost efficiency,
it may provide greater opportunities for the achievement of dynamic efficiencies because of the possible presence of competition
among provincial regulators.
II. THE NORMATIVE GOALS OF CANADIAN
SECURITIES REGULATION
Let us start with some motherhood about the goals of securities
regulation. The premise of the article is that it is extremely problematic that the current system for delivering regulation of securities markets in Canada is inefficient. Indeed, as the authors suggest,
*
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many of those making submissions to the Wise Persons'
Committee's' deliberations in 2003 singled this out as a defining
issue. We know that, substantively speaking, provincial securities
regulators in Canada are supposed to be achieving a variety of
objectives. One is efficiency in the operation of capital markets, but
others are investor protection and fairness. For example, it is
unlikely that an elaborate set of rules for public enforcement of
securities law would exist if the efficiency of the capital markets
were the only objective being pursued. Anand and Klein's useful
distinction between the substance and structure of regulation is relevant here. The argument would be, even if there are a variety of
substantive goals being achieved by securities regulation, should
the system for achieving those goals not be efficiently designed?
However it may be that system inefficiency is likewise only one of
a number of competing goals for one regulatory structure in
Canada. What are other possible normative goals for a decentralized
regulatory system? One might be provincial government control
over the local economy, of which the capital raising process is a
significant component. Another, related, normative goal of decentralization might be to maintain a robust role for regionalism. Political
scientist Janine Brodie has argued that
questions of where people live and how economic development, state activity and political power are distributed across geographical space often carry
more weight in Canadian politics than other potentially loaded questions
such as what people do or how well they live. In other words, Canadians
seem to be preoccupied more often with the 'where?' of politics than with
who gets what, when, and how.2

Acknowledging the possibility of normative contestation here
would require a more elaborate justification for prioritizing system
efficiency before moving to the more instrumental debate about
whether or not centralization of regulation will or will not contribute to that efficiency.
Ill. THE EVIDENCE OF INEFFICIENCY

One of the strengths of Anand and Klein's paper is a heightened
level of precision about the various meanings of efficiency. In
1.

See Wise Persons' Committee Report: Committee to Review the Structure of
Securities Regulation in Canada, It's Time (Ottawa, Department of Finance, 2003).

2.

See Janine Brodie, "The New Political Economy of Regions" in Wallace Clement, ed.,
Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy
(Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), pp. 240-41.
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particular the authors make an important distinction between various forms of cost inefficiency on the one hand, and the idea of
dynamic inefficiency on the other. In relation to cost inefficiencies,
the article argues that there is little empirical evidence available to
assess the existence or otherwise of cost inefficiency in the structure
of Canadian securities regulation. Indeed the authors' own study for
the Wise Persons' Committee, conducted in 2003, is the only
example cited.' Interestingly, the results of that study are rather
equivocal. It showed that "registrants are more likely to incur
material incremental costs than issuers who, by and large, do not
incur such costs as a result of the existence of multiple securities
regulators in Canada".' This suggests the need to explore further the
political implications of who might be bearing the costs of inefficiency. Anand and Klein's Cost Study in 2003 did report a high
level of concern among market participants "with the current state
of uncertainty in Canada's regulatory regime",' which was said to
detract from participants' ability to manage their businesses. While
it is not clear that this uncertainty translated directly into an
increased cost of doing business, it does raise the issue of assessing
what one might call the "dark figure" of the costs of securities regulatory inefficiency. In other words, does the decentralized nature
of Canadian securities regulation deter potential capital raisers or
investors, especially from outside the country, from venturing into
the field? This is of course a difficult calculation to make, but it
might render the cost inefficiency argument more compelling and
generalizable.
The paper also makes a contribution by developing the concept
of dynamic efficiency. The idea here is that an important indication
of the dynamism of a regulatory system is whether it is capable of
continuing to regulate effectively a market or markets that themselves change over time. The authors rely heavily on the findings of
Carpentier and Suret 6 that a centralized securities regulatory system
3.

4.

5.
6.

See Anita I. Anand and Peter Klein, "The Costs of Compliance in Canada's Securities
Regulatory Regime" in A. Douglas Harris, ed., Committee to Review the Structure of
Securities Regulation in Canada: Research Studies (Ottawa, Department of Finance,
2003), p. 517.
See Anita I. Anand and Peter Klein, "Inefficiency and Path Dependency in Canada's
Securities Regulatory System: Towards a Reform Agenda" (2005), 42 C.B.L.J. 41 at
p. 46.
Ibid., at p. 48.
See Cbcile Carpentier and Jean-Marc Suret, "The Canadian and American Financial
Systems: Competition and Regulation" (2003), 29 Can. Pub. Policy 433.
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would be unsuitable for Canada because of the high degree of concentration of its securities industry - which might lead to regulatory capture - and because of capital markets that are smaller and
shallower than those in the United States. While Anand and Klein
acknowledge that their conclusions here are speculative, there is a
worrisome lack of empirical support for the claims advanced in this
part of the article. Thus, whether or not there would be more or less
regulatory capture with a single national regulator as opposed to
multiple provincial regulators is not in my view an easy issue to
predict, and not necessarily an issue on which the American experience is likely to be a conclusive guide. For one thing, much
depends on the legislative protections put in place to ensure public
accountability and transparency. This view also seems to assume
that existing provincial regulators are not currently in a state of
capture. A detailed review of Carpentier and Suret's original arguments here is beyond the scope of this comment. But it is worth
noting that for Carpentier and Suret, a crucial manifestation of the
concentrated nature of the Canadian securities industry (banks,
brokerages and insurance companies) is the ability of a small
number of large industry players to capture an increasingly concentrated set of self-regulatory organizations (SROS), the Investment
Dealers Association, RS Inc. and the Toronto Stock Exchange,
which capture they purport to document in their paper. Their
acknowledgment of the key role of SROS in accomplishing securities regulation in Canada is helpful, but it raises another set of questions. Not least of these is, what are the relative capacities of multiple provincial regulators as opposed to a monopolistic single regulator to effectively oversee the activities of nationalized SROS? The
experience of the evolution of U.K. securities regulation from being
organized around a mosaic of SROS to a centralized Financial
Services Authority may be instructive here.
Finally, Anand and Klein agree with Carpentier and Suret's
proposition that a securities regulatory system that allows the participants to choose which system governs them "better aligns the
incentives of [capital market] participants and regulators"7 and thus
supports the maintenance of decentralization. Of course, only some
versions of a decentralized regulatory system, not including the
passport system currently being advanced by provinces and territories other than Ontario, would allow participants to have robust
7.

See Anand and Klein, supra, footnote 4, at p. 51.
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choices about which province would regulate them. But even where
participants do get to choose, it is not clear that all participants
equally get to choose. That is to say, while securities issuers might
be able to choose which Canadian province would regulate their
issuances, or registrants offering investment services might also be
so enabled, the retail investors who buy the securities or registrant
services offered might not be in a similar position. In other words,
one should not lose sight of the partiality of choice in a "regulatorselect" model of decentralized regulation. Now Carpentier and
Suret argue that "issuers will be drawn to the regime preferred by
investors to lower their cost of capital, and regulators will be able
to discern the efficiency of their regulatory choices by the flow of
firms into and out of jurisdictions".8 This claim about the relative
bargaining power of investors and issuers again requires close
empirical assessment in the Canadian context.
IV. REASONS FOR THE INEFFICIENCY
OF THE CURRENT STRUCTURE
As indicated above, Anand and Klein explain the persistence of
a decentralized securities regulatory regime in Canada by means of
the path dependency hypothesis. The authors point to two features
of the historical legacy of policy development to explain why the
current system may well prove impervious to radical change. These
features are (i) constitutional doctrines that have accorded pre-eminence to provincial autonomy in this field and (ii) institutional and
philosophical differences among key provincial regulators. They
make a persuasive argument that, despite the optimism of the Wise
Persons' Committee, the weakness and uncertainty associated with
the doctrine of paramountcy in Canadian constitutional law, from a
federal perspective, makes it an unlikely tool for replacing provincial powers with a strong federal presence. Of course, resort to constitutional contestation might not be necessary if key provinces
were attracted to the idea of a single regulator in Canadian securities markets. Anand and Klein explain the lack of persuasiveness of
this idea in terms of the desire of provincial regulators to retain their
power over regulation and in terms of philosophical differences in
the approach to provincial regulation that militate against consensus
here. As a sometime student of the role of interests and ideas in
8.

See Carpentier and Suret, supra, footnote 6, at p. 437.
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Canadian securities regulation,9 I have no quarrel with this general
approach. However, a serious look at the role of established
interests in maintaining the institutional status quo would arguably
have to go beyond the multi-faceted interests of government
regulators themselves and take into account those of key SROS,
issuer, financial industry and investor repeat players, new stakeholders and relevant provincial government departments. More
specifically, theorists of path dependency identify "the costs of
reversal" as a key driver of the policy process. This is the idea that
"when set-up or fixed costs are high, individuals and organizations
have strong incentives to identify and stick with a single option". 10
Focusing the analysis of current securities regulatory structures on
the issue of identifying and calculating the "costs of reversal" of
those arrangements might generate useful insights, especially for
reformers who wish to make alternatives more palatable to interests
favouring the existing arrangements. Interestingly, Anand and
Klein do suggest the possibility of a "catalyst" that might unlock
the current status quo, as occurred, they argue, in Australia as a
result of a series of financial scandals. This possibility raises a
broader issue about the limits of the path dependency hypothesis. Is
this literature adequately specific about just what it takes to overturn a path dependent trajectory?
V. CRITIQUE OF THE PASSPORT SYSTEM
Possibly the strongest aspect of this article is its thorough-going
critique of the passport system as it is currently conceived of by the
Steering Committee of provincial and territorial ministers that proposed it. Anand and Klein usefully analyze the elements of the
passport system proposal in terms of the various components of
cost inefficiency that they identify in their paper. Thus they argue
that the passport proposal does not completely solve the problems
of lack of harmonization of substantive law or the implementation
of law. Nor does it completely address the duplication of rules
problem and indeed may exacerbate it by introducing another decision-making body into the field, a Council of Ministers designed to
9.

See Mary G. Condon, Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities
Regulation (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998).
10. See John Myles and Paul Pierson, "The Comparative Political Economy of Pension
Reform" in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York,
Oxford University Press, 2001), 305 at p. 312.
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oversee the ongoing effectiveness of the passport system once it is
introduced. While prospects for improvement are somewhat better
in relation to opportunity cost risk, there remains the major hurdle
that Ontario has not signed on to the proposal, so that market
participants will have to deal with two regulatory structures where
there is an Ontario connection to a multi-provincial transaction. In
relation to the uncertainty problem, they astutely point to the ambiguities surrounding the handling of enforcement issues under a
passport system as a major stumbling block. The language of the
passport system proposal concerning enforcement appears to create
some potential for overlap and duplication of effort among
provinces on the one hand, and lack of coverage of enforcement
issues on the other. In any event, it retains significant discretion for
individual provinces in relation to enforcement action. However, it
should be noted that the proposal is accompanied by an "action
plan" for moving the initial agreement forward." This contemplates
increased efforts at coordination of enforcement priorities and practices among provincial regulators, as well2as harmonization of sanctions, remedies and maximum penalties.'
However, Anand and Klein sound a more positive note in relation
to the dynamic efficiency prospects of the passport model. This
perspective is premised on the claim that a passport system would
provide a "greater degree of regulatory competition, and thus
flexibility over time" than a single regulator because competition
will better align the incentives of market participants and regulators.' 3 Yet they also acknowledge the possibility that the "path
dependent nature of the regulatory environment may prevent...
sufficient openness among provincial regulators".'4 Again their
optimism might be more persuasive if it were accompanied by an
acknowledgement that introducing robust competition among
provincial regulators might require a different version of regulator
selection than that proposed currently, which is based on the
relatively limited criterion of the location of the issuer's head office.
As indicated earlier, their preference for provincial regulatory
11.

12.
13.
14.

See Provincial/Territorial Securities Initiative, Action Plan to Improve Canada's
Securities Regulatory Framework, online at <http://www.securitiescanada.org/
2004 0930_action-plansenglish.pdf>.
See Mary G. Condon, "The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Powers by Securities
Regulators in Canada" in Harris, supra, footnote 3, at p. 411.
See Anand and Klein, supra, footnote 4, at p. 7 1.
Ibid.
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competition might also be assisted by a somewhat more nuanced
account of the respective interests of regulators and market participants in this process, taking the variation in the latter category into
account. However, in the end a major achievement of Anand and
Klein's article is that it may open the way for a serious and contemporary debate about the issue of regulatory capture in Canadian
securities markets. Such a debate might address whether or not it
currently exists, who exercises it if it is present, and the prospects
for avoiding it in future regulatory arrangements. That debate is one
that is timely and very much worth having.

